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ackground to the debate: An important mechanism 
for protecting human research participants is the prior 
approval of a clinical study by a research ethics board, 
known in the United States as an institutional review 
board (IRB). Traditionally, IRBs have been run by volunteer 
committees of scientists and clinicians working in the 
academic medical centers where the studies they review 
are being carried out. However, for-proﬁ  t organizations 
are increasingly being hired to conduct ethics reviews. 
Proponents of for-proﬁ  t IRBs argue that these IRBs are just 
as capable as academic IRBs at providing high-quality ethics 
reviews. Critics argue that for-proﬁ  t IRBs have a conﬂ  ict of 
interest because they generate their income from clients 
who have a direct ﬁ  nancial interest in obtaining approval.
Ezekiel J. Emanuel’s Viewpoint: Let’s Dump the 
Outdated Ideology of “For-Proﬁ  t Bad, Not-for-
Proﬁ  t Good”
It is commonly thought that for-proﬁ  t companies are 
necessarily worse than not-for-proﬁ  t organizations doing 
similar activities. According to this thinking, for-proﬁ  t 
companies are heartless, place proﬁ  ts over people, quality, or 
integrity, and are inherently exploitative. For-proﬁ  t prisons 
must be worse than state-run prisons; for-proﬁ  t health plans 
are worse than not-for-proﬁ  t health plans; and surely for-proﬁ  t 
auto manufacturers are worse than not-for-proﬁ  t car makers.
This is a quaint notion. In prisons, we care about security 
and the respectful treatment and rehabilitation of the 
prisoners; in health plans we care about the quality of 
health care delivered to patients and the overall health of 
the people. Proﬁ  t status is a tax designation, not a quality 
indicator. At best, proﬁ  t status is a crude approximation—a 
proxy measure—for what we really care about: security and 
rehabilitation, or quality health care. What we should really 
focus on then is not the ideology of proﬁ  t status but these 
substantive outcome data. 
The same is true for IRBs. What we should focus on is not 
their tax status but the data regarding their quality. Are the 
IRBs evaluating protocols according to the ethical standards 
for clinical research? Are they ensuring that researchers 
are using reliable and valid scientiﬁ  c methods and selecting 
research participants fairly? Are the risks and beneﬁ  ts 
of the research reasonable? Does the informed consent 
document lucidly inform the patient without voluminous, 
superﬂ  uous, or distracting details? In addition, we want the 
IRB to carefully monitor the implementation of the protocol, 
especially monitoring for adverse events.
Why might we think that for-proﬁ  t IRBs do these functions 
poorly? Perhaps being for-proﬁ  t, they need to woo business, 
and so they are less independent of their clients, less inclined 
to be critical, and more inclined to overlook ethical problems. 
But these potential difﬁ  culties are not unique to for-proﬁ  t 
IRBs. Researchers who sit on not-for-proﬁ  t, academic IRBs 
are evaluating their colleagues’ research protocols, so these 
IRB members also have ties that may compromise their 
independence and critical evaluations. Furthermore, many 
academics tend to view IRB service as an uncompensated 
burden, which is not conducive to careful review work. 
Academic medical centers and their researchers also have 
their own ﬁ  nancial interests in getting research protocols 
passed. They get money—as well as access to new drugs and 
prestige—for conducting the research. Many not-for-proﬁ  t 
IRBs are also charging drug and device companies for review 
of their research protocols, and their rates are comparable to 
the rates charged by for-proﬁ  t IRBs.
The crucial question is whether an IRB, regardless 
of its tax status, is performing at a high level of quality. 
Unfortunately, there are no validated quality indicators for 
IRB function, and no head-to-head comparison has been 
made of the performance of for-proﬁ  t and not-for-proﬁ  t IRBs. 
However, to evaluate the quality of IRB function we have 
some approximate indicators such as regulatory compliance, 
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accreditation, knowledge sharing, and internal quality 
assurance practices.
In recent years the US’s Ofﬁ  ce for Human Research 
Protections (OHRP) has suspended, at least temporarily, 
the research being conducted at a number of major medical 
centers—including Johns Hopkins, Duke University, 
Rush University, University of Colorado, and University of 
Rochester. Furthermore, unexpected deaths in research 
participants that have captured the public eye have occurred 
at some of these same institutions—Johns Hopkins and 
University of Rochester—as well as at the University of 
Pennsylvania and Case Western Reserve University. The 
suspension of research by OHRP and the unexpected death 
of relatively healthy research participants are not perfect 
indicators of poor studies or poor IRB performance, but 
neither can they be dismissed as irrelevant. All of these 
prominent cases have occurred at not-for-proﬁ  t academic 
institutions.
The ﬁ  rst IRBs to receive “full accreditation”—the highest 
level of accreditation awarded by the Association for the 
Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs—
were one for-proﬁ  t IRB, Western Institutional Review Board 
(WIRB), and one not-for-proﬁ  t IRB, University of Iowa. And 
so it continued: of the ﬁ  rst eight organizations to receive full 
accreditation, four were for-proﬁ  t IRBs. 
At least 26 academic institutions outsource all or part of 
their protocol review to for-proﬁ  t IRBs. And in recent years, 
the OHRP has called upon WIRB to re-review protocols and 
revamp the IRB processes and procedures at not-for-proﬁ  t 
academic institutions where the OHRP had temporarily 
suspended research. Calling upon WIRB constitutes a vote 
of conﬁ  dence by federal regulators that at least this one 
for-proﬁ  t entity provides high-quality IRB review, and has 
something to teach the not-for-proﬁ  t academic centers about 
institutionalizing quality IRB review.
Furthermore, OHRP has never suspended a for-proﬁ  t 
IRB. And, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
issued only one warning letter to a for-proﬁ  t IRB compared to 
hundreds to IRBs at not-for-proﬁ  t institutions. 
For-proﬁ  t IRBs have made contributions to the common 
good. For example, WIRB has established a program allowing 
IRB administrators from developing countries in Latin 
America, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and other places to visit 
their location for six months of training in running an IRB. 
So far, 24 fellows have been trained. How many not-for-proﬁ  t 
IRBs have established programs to improve protocol review 
either in the US or other countries using their own money—
not grants from the National Institutes of Health?
Making a distinction about the quality and merits of 
IRBs based on tax status is an antiquated piece of ideology 
reminiscent of Orwell’s Animal Farm—“for-proﬁ  t bad, not-
for-proﬁ  t good.” The distinction obscures what we should 
care about and directly measure—the quality of IRB review 
of protocols and the monitoring of the safety of research 
participants. There are absolutely no data showing that either 
independence of reviewers or quality outcomes are correlated 
with an IRB’s proﬁ  t status, and there is some real evidence 
in the regulatory actions and accreditation that the quality of 
for-proﬁ  ts is as good as or better than many of their not-for-
proﬁ  t academic counterparts. Since we are supposed to be 
researchers and driven by data not emotion, let’s give up the 
crude ideology and stick to the data.
Trudo Lemmens and Carl Elliot’s Viewpoint: 
Commercial IRBs Have a Fundamental Conﬂ  ict 
of Interest 
Like it or not, research on humans has become 
a commercial enterprise. Most clinical trials have 
moved from academic settings to specialized contract 
research organizations (CROs), which contract with the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Whereas 63% 
of clinical trials were still being undertaken in academic 
settings in 1994, a mere 26% of such trials remained there in 
2004 [1]. 
It is widely recognized that the commercialization of 
medical research creates serious conﬂ  icts of interest [2–5]. 
What is often overlooked is that IRB review, which is often 
expected to provide protection against such conﬂ  icts, 
has also become commercialized. Some industry-funded 
trials are reviewed by in-house IRBs set up and funded by 
pharmaceutical companies or CROs themselves; others are 
reviewed by commercial, for-proﬁ  t IRBs [6]. Of course, 
commercial IRBs are not an entirely new phenomenon. The 
oldest and most successful IRB, WIRB, has been in business 
since 1968. What is new about commercial IRBs is their 
extraordinary reach. According to its founder, WIRB is now 
responsible for the review of more than half of all new drug 
submissions to the FDA [7]. Several universities and hospitals 
also outsource ethics review to commercial IRBs.
Yet commercial IRBs have a fundamental conﬂ  ict of 
interest [5,8–11]. They are in a client–provider business 
relationship with the commercial entities whose studies they 
review. Because commercial IRBs generate their income 
from clients with a direct ﬁ  nancial interest in obtaining 
approval, they are affected by the very problem they are 
expected to curtail. The ﬁ  nancial interests involved are 
huge. Pharmaceutical companies pay CROs for their speed 
and efﬁ  ciency. Clinical trials are a crucial step in the drug 
development process. Any delay in approval by an IRB affects 
the sponsor’s proﬁ  t margins. 
The countries that have allowed these private IRBs to 
ﬂ  ourish have also failed to regulate them carefully. Neither 
the US nor Canada has placed any serious restrictions on 
the establishment of new IRBs. Although an IRB registry 
has recently been set up for federally funded research in the 
US, and although the FDA and Health Canada sporadically 
inspect IRBs involved in the review of clinical trials, they 
do not have formal registration and approval processes for 
IRBs. Anyone who can bring together ﬁ  ve people, including 
a community representative, a physician, a lawyer and an 
“ethicist,” can set up shop and start competing for business. 
Moreover, regulations in those countries fail to prevent 
CROs from selecting the IRB least likely to reject the trial or 
delay approval by imposing too many restrictions. If one IRB 
is too stringent, they can simply go to the one next door.
Free market advocates will argue that the research industry 
has an interest in promoting quality IRB review. In theory, 
sound ethical review could prevent lawsuits, and commercial 
IRBs could use ethical review as a marketing tool. In fact, 
however, commercial IRBs market their speed and efﬁ  ciency, 
and lawsuits are still relatively rare. Most are settled out of 
court, with the records sealed from public view. Moreover, 
the costs of these lawsuits pale in comparison with the 
proﬁ  t gained by bringing a new drug faster to market. For 
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multinational pharmaceutical companies, litigation is a 
manageable cost of doing business.
Commercial IRBs ﬁ  ll a regulatory vacuum in countries 
that lack a governmentally organized system of ethics review. 
Yet, as Bloomberg Markets reported, several commercial IRBs 
have approved and been involved in overseeing controversial 
research practices. SFBC International, the largest CRO in 
the United States, has recruited undocumented immigrants 
to a converted motel in Miami and paid them to enroll in 
trials overseen by an unlicensed medical director [7]. Some 
of SFBC International’s clinical trials were approved by a now 
dismantled commercial IRB owned by the wife of an SFBC 
International vice president [7]. To oversee the research 
conducted at the Fabre Research Clinic, the clinic’s owner 
founded a private IRB that had his business partner and 
lawyer as members. The clinic was eventually shut down by 
the FDA after an investigation into the death of a research 
participant and more than ten years after the agency ﬁ  rst 
ﬂ  agged several serious research irregularities [12]. In another 
article, Bloomberg Markets reported that a Canadian afﬁ  liate of 
SFBC International, Montreal’s Anapharm, is currently being 
investigated by the Canadian drug regulatory authorities 
after several human research participants were infected with 
tuberculosis. Research participants had been submitted to 
basic medical screening, according to the report, but not 
to any speciﬁ  c tests for tuberculosis, even though the trial 
involved an immunosuppressant drug [13]. 
In 1999, Swiss authorities were alerted that a CRO in the 
Canton Basel was recruiting individuals from Eastern Europe 
and asylum seekers as research participants for Swiss clinical 
trials. An investigation conducted by a special working group 
for the drug regulatory agency revealed troubling consent 
procedures, such as consent forms being in languages 
the trial participants did not understand. The principal 
investigator for the clinical trials, who combined the position 
of CRO director with that of local director of the commercial 
IRB that approved the research, was not licensed to practice 
medicine [14]. 
At a time when commercial interests threaten the safety of 
research participants and the integrity of medical research, it 
is remarkable that North American regulatory agencies have 
not seen any problem with entrusting the rights and well-
being of human research participants to a lightly regulated 
commercial enterprise. In the wake of the Swiss scandal, the 
authorities in Basel introduced new regulations requiring 
registration and regulatory approval of IRBs. IRBs also 
received exclusive jurisdiction, making it impossible to shop 
for the most lenient IRB. These new regulations, under which 
no commercial IRBs were approved, were upheld by the 
Swiss Supreme Court. The court argued that research ethics 
committees fulﬁ  ll a public function with a direct mandate 
from the state [15,16]. It is time for regulatory authorities in 
Canada and the US to follow suit. The protection of research 
participants is a critically important public mandate, and it 
merits a truly independent regulatory structure.
Emmanuel’s Response to Lemmens and Elliot’s 
Viewpoint
I agree with Lemmens and Elliot that “the protection of 
research subjects is a critically important public mandate, and 
it merits a truly independent regulatory structure.” That is 
where the agreement ends.
Lemmens and Elliot claim that “commercial IRBs have 
a fundamental conﬂ  ict of interest.” But IRBs at academic 
medical centers have even greater conﬂ  icts of interest [17]. 
Both commercial and academic IRBs have a ﬁ  nancial conﬂ  ict 
of interest, especially since increasingly academic IRBs are 
charging competitive prices for their services, making them 
indistinguishable from commercial IRBs. Academic IRBs have 
the additional conﬂ  ict that the researchers being reviewed are 
colleagues of the IRB members. And they have yet a further 
conﬂ  ict since the institution wants and needs the commercial 
research in order to gain access to new drugs and devices to 
enhance its reputation as innovative.
Lemmens and Elliot conﬂ  ate CROs and commercial IRBs, 
trying to tar the reputation of commercial IRBs with unsavory 
practices of CROs. Furthermore, when all the hyperbole 
is ignored, these authors base all their objections on just 
three anecdotes, rather than on rigorous scientiﬁ  c data. 
That the owners/operators of SFCB, Fabre Research Clinic, 
and a research center in Switzerland have been accused of 
unscrupulous practices hardly constitutes an indictment of all 
commercial IRBs. Using similar logic one might indict all not-
for-proﬁ  t IRBs because of the documented poor performance 
of academic IRBs that had to be suspended at Johns Hopkins, 
Duke University, University of Colorado, University of 
Rochester, etc.
Lemmens and Elliot marshal absolutely no scientiﬁ  c 
data to show that any of the major commercial IRBs in the 
US—including WIRB, Schulman, Chesapeake, Essex, and 
Copernicus—are performing poorly. The authors cite no 
studies, for example, to show that the quality of the reviews by 
these IRBs is poor or that these IRBs have approved unethical 
studies. I do not know whether these IRBs are all good, but 
if Lemmens and Elliot’s broad indictment leveled against 
all commercial IRBs is valid, they surely should provide 
data about the poor quality of the major commercial IRBs, 
since these account for the majority of reviews done in the 
commercial sector. Otherwise, the charges appear to be good 
headlines, but are baseless.
Finally, despite their rhetoric, Lemmens and Elliot do not 
actually call for the prohibition of commercial IRBs. They 
want more regulatory oversight. Yet, I am unaware of their 
having delineated a comprehensive proposal describing such 
an oversight system. With Wood and Grady, I have proposed a 
system of regional ethics organizations that would review and 
monitor research protocols, educate researchers on the ethics 
of human research, and develop policies in controversial 
areas, such as paying participants [18]. Such organizations 
would completely eliminate conﬂ  icts of interest, ﬁ  nancial 
and otherwise, between the reviewing organizations and 
researchers. Maybe this is something Lemmens and Elliot can 
agree with? If not, let’s hear their positive proposal for a “truly 
independent regulatory structure.”
Lemmens and Elliott’s Response to Emanuel’s 
Viewpoint
Not too long ago, an article on the protection of sick and 
vulnerable research participants that compared the funding 
of IRBs to the funding of for-proﬁ  t jails would have been read 
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as satire. In North America today, however, where medical 
research happily converges with consumer capitalism, even 
bioethicists believe that the market ultimately works for justice. 
Do we need to point out that the problem with the consumerist 
model for protecting research participants is not, as Emanuel 
suggests, its “tax status”? The problem is that commercial IRBs 
are paid in full by the very companies conducting the research. 
What is more, those companies are free to shop around for any 
IRB whose reviews they ﬁ  nd congenial. Research participants 
who are worried that they may face death or injury in a study 
sponsored by a pharmaceutical company are unlikely to feel 
more secure knowing that their safety has been entrusted to a 
panel of paid experts whose ﬁ  nancial livelihood depends on a 
company paycheck.
Acknowledging that no good data exist to compare 
commercial and university IRBs, Emanuel nevertheless 
exhorts us to “stick to the data” anyway, recommending 
the example of WIRB, a commercial IRB that earned $20 
million in 2004, and whose president was Emanuel’s research 
collaborator (as he acknowledges in his competing interests 
statement). Yet part of the data he omits from his enthusiastic 
recommendation comes from Bloomberg Markets, which 
reported in December that WIRB “oversaw tests in California 
and Georgia in the 1990s for which doctors were criminally 
charged and jailed for lying to the FDA and endangering 
the lives of trial participants. No action was taken against 
WIRB” (p. 37 of [7]). The same report revealed that WIRB 
had settled a lawsuit after it approved a placebo-controlled 
trial for a Genentech psoriasis drug in which a patient was 
severely injured, that it had drawn criticism from the FDA in 
inspection visits, and that on one occasion, when reviewing 
protocols for Johns Hopkins University, it reversed a previous 
decision under pressure from a clinical sponsor, using a panel 
dominated by alternate members.
It is rarely, if ever, possible to know whether ﬁ  nancial 
incentives have improperly inﬂ  uenced a member of an IRB. 
This uncertainty is the reason for rules about conﬂ  icts of 
interest—to prevent people from being placed in situations 
where they are likely to be improperly inﬂ  uenced. We agree 
with Emanuel that academic IRBs are marred by many of the 
same problems facing for-proﬁ  t IRBs, including conﬂ  icts of 
interest [6,19]. But the problems of academic IRBs do not 
make those of for-proﬁ  t IRBs disappear. The proper solution 
is to clean up the conﬂ  icts of interest, not to institute a 
replacement in which such conﬂ  icts are built right into the 
system.
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